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KEEPING TILLMAN ADJOURNMENTS IN THEIR 
PLACE:  A REJOINDER TO SETH BARRETT 
TILLMAN 
Brian C. Kalt*
Seth Barrett Tillman’s reply1 warrants a rejoinder on two points.  First, 
I reject Tillman’s defense of his claim that the Senate can unilaterally ter-
minate its half of a regular session of Congress.  Second, Tillman argues 
that the Senate can terminate a special Senate-only session called by the 
President, and claims that I disagree.  I did not and do not. 
I. REGULAR SESSIONS 
A regular congressional session begins either by law2 or presidential 
edict,3 and ends either by bicameral agreement4 or presidential edict.5  
Tillman would add that each chamber can convene or terminate its own ses-
sions, via unicameral rule.6  This is important for his main point:  that dur-
ing a bicameral session, the Senate can unilaterally end “their session,” and 
thus end a recess appointee’s term. 
Tillman tries three tacks.  First, he notes that the Recess Appointments 
Clause speaks of Senate recesses and Senate sessions, not congressional 
ones.  He uses this to disagree with my contention that both chambers must 
agree on adjourning a regular session.7  But the Constitution specifically al-
lows the President to call Senate-only special sessions, and such sessions 
 
*  Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law.  Thanks again to Jorge E. Souss. 
1  Seth Barrett Tillman, Terminating Presidential Recess Appointments:  A Reply to Professor Brian 
C. Kalt, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 94 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview 
/colloquy/2007/4/ (link). 
2  See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (link) (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, 
and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a differ-
ent day.”). 
3  See id. art. II, § 3 (link) (empowering President to, “on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses”). 
4  See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (link) (classifying adjournments as a question on which both chambers must 
agree); see also id. art. II, § 3 (empowering President to adjourn Congress when the chambers cannot 
agree).  As discussed in Section II, the Senate can unilaterally adjourn a Senate-only session; given that 
the House is not in session, it obviously cannot participate. 
5  See id. art. II, § 3 (empowering President to adjourn Congress when the chambers cannot agree on 
when to adjourn). 
6  Tillman, supra note 1, at 98. 
7  Id. at 97. 
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were commonly called in the past to consider nominations.8  Because the 
House is irrelevant to the confirmation process, recess appointments natu-
rally turn only on whether the Senate is around.  Similarly, because the 
President can convene the Senate without convening the House, it makes 
sense to end a recess appointment anytime the President has done so—and 
it makes no sense to wait for the House to convene and adjourn as well.9  
The fact that the President can call a Senate-only session does nothing to 
prove that the Senate can end a bicameral session unilaterally. 
Tillman also tries to make hay of the confusion surrounding the defini-
tions of a “session,” “recess,” and “adjournment.”10  To my textual evidence 
against a unilateral power of the Senate to terminate a regular session, 
Tillman retorts that my clauses mention adjournments, not Senate recesses 
or sessions.11  He follows this with an attempt to distinguish adjournments 
from recesses, citing Jefferson’s Manual and a note on Australian prac-
tice.12  But the only relevant question for terminating recess appointments is 
what constitutes a session.13  Tillman’s own go-to source, Jefferson’s Man-
ual, asks of Congress, “What then constitutes a session with them?”14  Jef-
ferson’s answer is similar to mine.  Sessions begin by direction of either the 
Constitution, by law, or by the President.  They can end either by the begin-
ning of one of these new sessions, “by the efflux of their time” (i.e., the ex-
piration of the term), or by an adjournment by “joint vote” of the two 
chambers.15
Because the Constitution is less than crystal clear on the definition of a 
session, it seems only natural to advert to sources like Jefferson’s Manual, 
 
8  Brian C. Kalt, Keeping Recess Appointments in Their Place, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 88, 
90-91, n.14 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/ (link). 
9  To my argument that it is constitutionally offensive—but not technically forbidden—to involve 
the House into a drag-out fight between the Senate and President over appointments, Tillman makes the 
point that the issue here is removals, not appointments.  Tillman, supra note 1, at 99.  Tillman is literally 
correct, though his point is weakened by my concession that two-house Tillman adjournments are not 
technically forbidden.  I maintain, however, that if the Senate were pushing a Tillman adjournment as its 
next salvo in a fight over filling a particular office, a conscientious House member should strive to stay 
out of that fight. 
10  Id. at 97. 
11  Id.  The clauses in question are those cited supra, notes 2–5. 
12  Tillman, supra, note 1, at 97, n.27 (arguing that a recess “terminates prior legislative business” 
while an adjournment does not).  Tillman’s interpretation is belied by Senate Rule XVIII, which speci-
fies that undetermined legislative business is carried over from one “session of a Congress” to the sec-
ond, and any subsequent ones, as if no break had occurred.  Thus, only the close of the congressional 
term terminates Senate business, not the end of a session. 
13  The question of what constitutes a recess is disputed, but I doubt both that Tillman and I disagree 
on the issue and that it matters for our current discussion. 
14  THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 51 (2d ed. 1812), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/tj/tj-mpp.htm (link). 
15  Id.  Jefferson does not mention the possibility of the President adjourning Congress in the case of 
a disagreement between the chambers, but Article II, Section 3 makes clear that this is the alternative to 
a “joint vote.” 
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and to the clear precedents that accompany them.  That takes us to 
Tillman’s third tack:  after he “concede[s] a long-enduring useful tradition 
of interhouse comity” on ending sessions, he states that I “must” show that 
“past Congresses believed they had to act as they did, not merely that they 
chose to do so.”16  I reject Tillman’s notion that historical evidence must be 
this black-or-white to have any value.  To be sure, it would be impressive 
evidence if Congress said that it had to end regular sessions bicamerally.  
But it would be equally impressive if Congress said that it didn’t have to do 
this, and was just choosing to do so.  I have no explicit slam-dunk evidence 
like the former, but Tillman has no evidence at all like the latter.  And he 
needs it more than I do.  Elsewhere, Tillman (again quoting Jefferson) notes 
that “one precedent in favor of power is stronger than an hundred against 
it,”17 but Tillman has no historical precedents on this point, and hundreds 
against him.18
Another structural point bears mention:  the Senate cannot convene a 
session by itself, either.  Assume that the President makes a controversial 
recess appointment and the Senate wants to kill it with a one-house Tillman 
adjournment—either the recessed Senate convenes a new session and ad-
journs, or the returning Senate adjourns the session and reconvenes.  How 
would it convene?  It cannot vote to do so; by definition, it does not vote 
when it is not in session.  Perhaps Tillman believes that the Senate could 
delegate the convening power to, say, the Majority Leader; Tillman notes 
that the Constitution empowers each House to “compel absent members to 
attend,” and he claims that this power exists “without regard to any extant 
‘Session of Congress.’”19  But it is a stretch to take the power to round up a 
quorum while in session and rewrite it as the power of a rump to convene a 
session.  The “absent member” language simply does not match up with the 
 
16  Tillman, supra note 1, at 99. 
17  Id. at 96 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 226 (1782)). 
18  The first 240 bicameral congressional sessions are described at UNITED STATES SENATE, 
SESSIONS OF CONGRESS (2003), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/congresses2.pdf (link).  
Note that in each case, even when the House and Senate adjourned at different times, the session did not 
end until both chambers adjourned.  More to the point, the sessions ended only by bicameral arrange-
ment—what Tillman conceded was “a long-enduring useful tradition of interhouse comity,” see Tillman, 
supra note 1, at 5—though a fully annotated footnote on this point would be longer than the rest of this 
article.  
19  Tillman, supra note 1, at 98 n.30 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1).  I do not agree that the 
clause speaks without regard to an extant session.  The clause is part of Article I, Section 5, which com-
prises a series of provisions on the business of Congress in session.  Tillman also argues that the House 
must be able to convene itself unilaterally to begin preliminary investigations for an impeachment.  Id. at 
5.  But there is nothing to prevent a House committee from doing such preliminary work between ses-
sions—or to prevent a Senate committee from doing preliminary work on a nomination.  See Michael A. 
Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 2204, 2241–43 (1994) (discussing examples of Senate committee work during recesses).  Fi-
nally, it is noteworthy that Congress does delegate the authority to reconvene to its leaders, but only dur-
ing intra-session recesses.  See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 353, 105th Cong., 112 Stat. 3699 (1998) (link). 
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constitutional provisions that expressly discuss convening sessions.20  Even 
if the Senate had the power to end a session, in other words, it lacks the 
power to start a new one.  Indeed, because new sessions begin by law or 
presidential edict, even a bicameral Tillman adjournment (which I concede 
is possible) would preclude Congress from immediately reconvening unless 
it could pass a new law—subject to presidential veto—to move up the start-
ing date of the next session.  This raises the cost of a Tillman adjournment 
prohibitively. 
II. SENATE-ONLY SPECIAL SESSIONS 
Tillman says I argue that “the termination of a Senate special session 
called by the President requires the consent of the President,” a proposition 
for which, he says, I “put[] forward no on-point authority.”21  Regarding the 
precedents I cited on Senate-only special sessions—in which the Senate 
formally asked the President if he was ready for it to adjourn—Tillman 
writes that I “see[] a legislative body acting responsibly and civilly, and as-
sume[] that this must mean that the members were constrained to do so by 
the Constitution.”22
I never claimed, however, that the President has the constitutional 
power to prevent the Senate from unilaterally adjourning a Senate special 
session.  In my original piece, in a section called “Political Ramifications” 
(distinct from the section labeled “Constitutional Concerns”), I wrote that as 
a “practical” corollary to the President’s power to convene and reconvene a 
special session, the Senate’s “functional[]” ability to adjourn is compro-
mised.23  I concluded, therefore, that the Senate could unilaterally adjourn 
its one-house special session, but that if it did so to terminate a recess ap-
pointment, the effort would fail—for the “practical, political” reasons that I 
described, not for any constitutional ones.24
The President’s power to convene and reconvene the Senate does raise 
one constitutional issue.  Tillman notes that Article II limits the President’s 
power to “extraordinary Occasions,” and he wonders whether I “seriously 
contend that a mere interbranch dispute over a mundane recess appointment 
is an ‘extraordinary Occasion’?”25  Indeed I do.  Before the Twentieth 
 
20  See supra notes 3–4. 
21  Tillman, supra, note 1, at 95. 
22  Id. at 96. 
23  Kalt, supra note 8, at 90. 
24  Id. at 91-92.  Tillman also questions the strength of the historical precedents I cite, because—as 
he correctly notes—the Senate did not always formally defer to the President before adjourning its one-
house special sessions.  Tillman, supra note 1, at 96.  But that is a matter of mere ceremony; my (admit-
tedly cursory) review of the record on these occasions did not show that the Senate was leaving unfin-
ished presidential business on the table, and I do not understand Tillman to be arguing otherwise.  These 
adjournments were thus affronts to ritual if anything, and not to presidential power. 
25  Tillman, supra note 1, at 96 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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Amendment mooted the practice, every elected presidency began with a 
Senate-only special session, called by the previous President pursuant to 
this Article II power.26  I do not understand Tillman to contend that these 
clockwork special sessions were unconstitutionally ordinary occasions.  
Now imagine one of these special sessions ending with the Senate defying 
the President and adjourning, and the President retaliating by reconvening 
the Senate.  This would doubtlessly be even less ordinary.  Surely a Tillman 
adjournment—relying on a novel reading of the Constitution and breaking 
over two hundred years of precedent—would be an extraordinary occasion. 
 
26  See UNITED STATES SENATE, supra note 19.  The Senate special sessions are cited more specifi-
cally in Kalt, supra note 8, at 91 n.14. 
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